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ACCRUAL OF THE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: PENROD v. HOSKINSON
Jim Reynolds
A woman is told in 1963 that she has cancer of the soft palate
as a result of x-ray treatments she received in 1952.'
A surgical gauze pad begins to ooze from the hip of a man in
1962. It was left there during surgery in 1955.2
A woman undergoes surgery for the removal of a section of
gallbladder in 1965. Her gallbladder was to have been completely
removed in 1949.1
In 1973, a surgical needle is discovered imbedded in the abdom-
inal wall of a woman. Surgeons operating on her in 1971 left it there.'
In 1973, doctors find a surgical drain in the abdomen of a
woman who had last undergone surgery in 1969.1
These incidents suggest some of the problems arising in the
medical malpractice area. This note will focus on two aspects of
accrual of a cause of action for medical malpractice. Specifically,
this note will examine: a) the status of the so-called "discovery
doctrine" of medical malpractice in Montana, and b) the accrual
of a cause of action for medical malpractice for the purpose of deter-
mining which statute of limitation governs the action.
I. THE STATUS OF THE DISCOVERY DOCTRINE IN MONTANA
A. Background
In response to the perceived harshness' of statutes of limitation
prescribing a flat time limit for medical malpractice actions,' courts
in the majority of states' have devised various doctrines to soften the
1. Quinlan v. Gudes, 2 Mich. App. 506, 140 N.W.2d 782 (1966).
2. Johnson v. Saint Patrick's Hosp., 148 Mont. 125, 417 P.2d 469 (1966).
3. Winfrey v. Farhat, 382 Mich. 380, 170 N.W.2d 34 (1969).
4. Stoner v. Carr, 97 Idaho 641, 550 P.2d 259 (1976).
5. Penrod v. Hoskinson, - Mont. -, 552 P.2d 325 (1976).
6. See, e.g., Yoshizaki v. Hilo Hosp., 50 Hawaii 150, 433 P.2d 220, 223 (1967): "The
injustice of barring plaintiff's action before she could reasonably have been aware that she
had a claim is patent." Contra, Graham v. Updegraph, 144 Kan. 45, 58 P.2d 475 (1936).
7. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 12-301 (1973) (within three years of injury); IND. CODE ANN. §
16-9.5-3-1 (Bums Supp. 1976) (within two years of date of act); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.07
(West 1947) (within two years of act); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 34 (Purdon 1953) (within two
years of act); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 15-1-14.1 (Supp. 1976) (within three years of act);
VA. CODE § 8-24 (Supp. 1976) (within two years of act); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.205 (West 1966)
(within three years of act).
8. For a list of states adhering to one of the discussed doctrines at the time of publica-
1
Reynolds: Accrual Of The Cause Of Action For Medical Malpractice: Penrod v. Hoskinson
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1977
MONTANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38
impact of these statutes on putative plaintiffs. Although application
of these doctrines vary, they can be grouped into four general cate-
gories.
The date-of-act doctrine is the most harsh and inflexible. Cases
decided under this theory' hold that the cause of action accrues at
the time of injury. This doctrine does not soften the impact of the
statute of limitation and often results in injustice to the plaintiff. °
The continuing treatment doctrine, one of the earliest judicial
doctrines developed to circumvent the date of act doctrine," has
never gained wide recognition as an acceptable alternative and is
now followed in only a few states 2 and there only because of specific
statutory language mandating it.'" Under this doctrine, the cause of
action does not accrue, and the statute of limitation does not run,
until termination of the physician-patient relationship.'"
The fraudulent concealment doctrine is the result of trans-
planting fraud concepts onto malpractice concepts. The result is a
hybrid doctrine, universally applied when the facts justify it.'" It
holds that when a doctor employs artifice to prevent inquiry, to
escape investigation, or to conceal information disclosing a patient's
right of action," the cause of action does not accrue, nor does the
statute of limitation begin to run, until discovery of the facts by the
owner of the cause of action. 7 This doctrine has been applied in
several state courts which also adhere to one of the other doctrines, '
tion, see Comment, 1 HOFSTRA L. REV. 277 (1973).
9. E.g., Williamson v. Edmondson, 257 Ark. 837, 520 S.W.2d 260 (1975); Blank v.
Community Hosp., 143 Ind. App. 333, 240 N.E.2d 562 (1968); Tantish v. Szendey, 158 Me.
228, 182 A.2d 660 (1962); Pasquale v. Chandler, 350 Mass. 450, 215 N.E.2d 319 (1966); Shearin
v. Lloyd, 246 N.C. 363, 98 S.E.2d 508 (1957).
10. Supra note 8.
11. It was first applied in Gillette v. Tucker, 67 Ohio St. 106, 65 N.E.2d 865 (1902).
12. Hammond v. Weiss, 46 Mich. App. 717, 208 N.W.2d 578 (1973); Murray v. Fox, 300
Minn. 373, 220 N.W.2d 356 (1974); Borgia v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d 151, 237 N.Y.S.2d
319, 187 N.E.2d 777 (1962); Wyler v. Trippi, 25 Ohio St.2d 164, 267 N.E.2d 419 (1971).
13. E.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.5838 (Supp. 1976); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. & RULES LAW §
214-a (McKinney Supp. 1976).
14. Gillette v. Tucker, 67 Ohio St. 106, 65 N.E. 865 (1902).
15. E.g., Crossett Health Center v. Croswell, 221 Ark. 874, 256 S.W.2d 548 (1953); Allen
v. Layton, 235 A.2d 261 (Del. 1967); Wilder v. Saint Joseph Hosp., 225 Miss. 42, 82 So.2d
651 (1955); Lakeman v. LaFrance, 102 N.H. 300, 156 A.2d 123 (1959); Coffman v. Hedrick,
437 S.W.2d 60 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
16. Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 368 (1961); Draws v. Levin, 332 Mich. 447, 52 N.W.2d 180
(1952).
17. Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 368 (1961).
18. E.g., Crossett Health Center v. Croswell, 121 Ark. 874, 256 S.W.2d 548 (1953);
Murray v. Fox, 300 Minn. 373, 220 N.W.2d 356 (1974); Shearin v. Lloyd, 246 N.C. 363, 98
S.E.2d 508 (1957). Montana has recognized the fraudulent concealment doctrine both by case
law, Monroe v. Harper, 164 Mont. 23, 518 P.2d 788 (1974), and by statute, REVISED CODES OF
MONTANA (1947) [hereinafter cited R.C.M. 19471, § 93-2624.
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and has been codified in several states.' 9
The fourth doctrine is the discovery doctrine:
Simply and clearly stated the discovery rule is: The limitation
statute or statutes in malpractice cases do not start to run until
the date of discovery, or the date when, by the exercise of reasona-
ble care, plaintiff should have discovered the wrongful act. 20
This doctrine was first enunciated, though not applied to the
facts before the court, in a 1917 Maryland decision. 2' Not until the
1950's and 1960's, however, was it seized upon by the courts as an
equitable solution to the medical malpractice problem. By 1977,
forty states had adopted some form of the doctrine, either judicially
or legislatively.22 Montana was among them. 3
B. The Development of the Discovery Doctrine in Montana
Until the adoption of the discovery doctrine by the Montana
Supreme Court,' 4 the controlling Montana decision as to the accrual
of a cause action for medical malpractice was an 1872 case, Coady
v. Reims, 5 dealing with treatment of a fractured arm. This decision
19. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-564 (Supp. 1976); CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 340.5 (West
Supp. 1976); FLA. STAT. § 95.11 (1975); HAW. REV. STAT. § 657-7.3 (Supp. 1975); IDAHO CODE
§ 5-219 (Supp. 1975); NEV. REV. STAT. § 11.400 (1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-18 (Supp.
1975).
20. Johnson v..Caldwell, 371 Mich. 368, 123 N.W.2d 785, 791 (1963).
21. Hahn v. Claybrook, 130 Md. 179, 100 A. 83 (1917).
22. By judicial decision only: Jones v. Rogers Memorial Hosp., 442 F.2d 773 (D.C. Cir.
1971); Shillady v. Elliott Community Hosp., 114 N.H. 321, 320 A.2d 637 (1974); Fernandi v.
Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 277 (1961); Hardin v. Farris, 87 N.M. 143, 530 P.2d 407 (1974);
Melnyk v. Cleveland Clinic, 32 Ohio St.2d 198, 290 N.E.2d 569 (1973); Ayers v. Morgan, 397
Pa. 282, 154 A.2d 788 (1959); Coffman v. Hedrick, 437 S.W.2d 60 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968);
Morgan v. Grace Hosp., 149 W.Va. 783, 144 S.E.2d 156 (1965). By statute: ALA. CODE tit. 7,
§ 25(1) (Supp. 1973); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-564 (Supp. 1976); CAL. Civ. PRO. CODE § 340.5
(West Supp. 1976); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-105 (Supp. 1976); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-584
(1977); DEL. CODE tit. 18, § 6856 (Supp. 1976); FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(b) (1975); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 3-1102, 3-1103 (Supp. 1976); HAW. REV. STAT. § 657-7.3 (Supp. 1975); IDAHO CODE § 5-219
(Supp. 1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, § 22.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977); IOWA CODE ANN. § 614.1
(West Supp. 1976); KAN. STAT. § 60-513 (1975); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.140 (Baldwin
Supp. 1976); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9.5628 (West Supp. 1976); MD. CTS. & JUD. PRO. CODE
ANN. § 5-109 (Supp. 1976); MIss. CODE ANN. § 15-1-36 (Supp. 1976); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 516.105
(Vernon Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-222 (1975); NEV. REV. STAT. § 11.400 (1975); N.Y.
Civ. PRAc. LAW & RULES LAW § 214-a (McKinney Supp. 1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15
(Interim Supp. 1976); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-18 (Supp. 1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 76, §
18 (West Supp. 1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 12.110 (1975); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-14.1 (Supp. 1976);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3415 (Supp. 1976); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-28 (Supp. 1975); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 512 (Supp. 1976); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.350 (Supp. 1975); Wvo. STAT.
§ 1-18.1 (Interim Supp. 1976).
23. Johnson v. Saint Patrick's Hosp., 148 Mont. 125, 417 P.2d 469 (1966), discussed in
28 MONT. L. REV. 121 (1966); R.C.M. 1947, § 93-2624.
24. Johnson v. Saint Patrick's Hosp., 148 Mont. 125, 417 P.2d 469 (1966).
25. 1 Mont. 424 (1872).
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applied the "date-of-act" doctrine - that the cause of action ac-
crues on the day the act constituting malpractice is performed.
This decision lay relatively dormant until 1966 when Bror John-
son's case was presented to the supreme court.2" A physician had left
surgical gauze in Johnson's hip during surgery in 1955. In 1962, this
gauze began to ooze from a sinus which had developed around it.
The supreme court, faced with a three year statute of limitation on
malpractice actionsn and the "date-of-act" holding of Coady, and
apparently desirous of allowing Johnson to prosecute his action, was
forced to negate one or the other. It negated Coady,"5 and adopted
the discovery doctrine from an Idaho case:29
Where a foreign object is negligently left in a patient's body by a
surgeon and the patient is in ignorance of the fact, and conse-
quently of his right of action for malpractice, the cause of action
does not accrue until the patient learns of or in the exercise of
reasonable care and diligence should have learned of the presence
of such foreign object in his body. 0
Having determined when the cause of action accrued, the court
then applied the Montana statute3 which provides a cause of action
shall be brought "[w]ithin three years .. .upon an obligation or
liability, not founded upon an instrument in writing, other than a
contract, account, or promise." Counting forward from the date
Johnson discovered the gauze pad in his hip joint, the court found
that he had filed a timely suit.
This rule apparently does not establish a maximum time period
for bringing a malpractice action. In recognition of this apparent
omission, the court in 1967, in Grey v. Silverbow County,32 adopted
equitable criteria which were set forth in 1965 by the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Owens v. White:33
26. Johnson v. Saint Patrick's Hosp., 148 Mont. 125, 417 P.2d 469 (1966).
27. R.C.M. 1947, § 93-2605(3).
28. There is some question whether the court actually overruled Coady, or, in fact,
whether it needed to overrule it, given the differences in the fact situations. Coady involved
blatant malpractice, visible to the patient from time of treatment; Johnson's situation, on
the other hand, involved hidden malpractice which became apparent only when the gauze
began to come out of his hip. See Johnson v. Saint Patrick's Hosp., 148 Mont. 125, 417 P.2d
469 (1966) (Doyle, J., dissenting).
29. Billings v. Sisters of Mercy, 86 Idaho 485, 389 P.2d 224 (1964).
30. Johnson v. Saint Patrick's Hosp., 148 Mont. 125, 417 P.2d 469, 473 (1966).
31. R.C.M. 1947, § 93-2605(3).
32. 149 Mont. 213, 425 P.2d 819 (1967).
33. 342 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1965). This decision purported to apply Idaho law in deciding
the extent to which the discovery doctrine would be applied in Idaho. The Circuit Court held
that the doctrine should be limited, under Idaho law, to cases involving foreign objects left
in the body. In 1970, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected this limitation and extended the
doctrine to cases involving misdiagnosis. In so doing, the Idaho court stated, "While Owens
[Vol. 38
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[T]he discovery doctrine is itself subject to some restraint as the
time from the occurrence of the malpractice grows greater. In such
circumstances, the considerations of fairness to the defendant un-
derlying statutes of limitation become more insistent, while plain-
tiff's appeal to equity implicit in the discovery doctrine becomes
less so. . . . Thus, the suit of a plaintiff who is reasonably diligent
may be barred if the defendant shows undue prejudice because of
an extreme lapse of time between the commission of the wrongful
act and the commencement of the suit. To so conclude strikes us
as a reasonable accommodation between the competing considera-
tions noted in Billings (sic) of giving full scope to the statute of
limitation on the one hand and according a reasonable measure of
justice to the plaintiff on the other. 4
The Montana court added that "[t]he 'discovery doctrine' has
a very narrow field of application and can only be successfully and
fairly applied if it retains the flexibility suggested in the Owens
case. . . ."I' The court has not gone beyond the Grey criteria to
define specific time limits on the discovery doctrine.
Since the Johnson decision, other plaintiffs have urged the
court to extend the discovery doctrine to causes of action not involv-
ing foreign objects left in the body. In Grey, the court applied the
doctrine to extend the statute of limitation in a case filed three years
and fifty-seven days after surgery when an infection did not become
apparent until fifty-seven days after surgery."
The federal district court for Montana, analogizing from the
Johnson and Grey decisions, extended the doctrine to a products
liability case in which prescribed medication had caused cataracts. 7
In deciding Hornung v. Richardson-Merrill, Inc., Judge Russell
Smith explained this broader discovery doctrine:
Where a person is ignorant of the fact that he has been damaged
by the defendant, and consequently ignorant of his right of action,
the cause does not accrue until the person learns, or in the exercise
of reasonable care and diligence should have learned, the cause of
his damage, subject however, to the duty of the court to balance
the diligence of the plaintiff as against the prejudice caused to the
defendant by the delay.3 8
v. White may have been a correct inference based on the then existing Idaho decisions, our
opinion today renders that decision an incorrect prediction of the future actions of this
Court." Renner v. Edwards, 93 Idaho 836, 475 P.2d 530, 531 (1970).
34. Grey v. Silver Bow County, 149 Mont. 213, 425 P.2d 819, 821 (1967). The reference
to "Billings" is to Billings v. Sisters of Mercy, 86 Idaho 485, 389 P.2d 224 (1964).
35. Grey v. Silver Bow County, 149 Mont. 213, 425 P.2d 819, 821 (1967).
36. Id.
37. Hornung v. Richardson-Merrill, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 183 (D. Mont. 1970).
38. Id. at 185.
19771
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Although not quarreling with the statement in Hornung, the
Montana Supreme Court refused to extend the discovery doctrine
to an action arising out of the destruction of a private water source
by an oil company, where the damage was not apparent for a year
after the company's activities ceased. Instead, the court applied the
general rule concerning accrual of a cause of action:
The fact that a person entitled to an action has no knowledge of
his right to sue or of the facts out of which his right arises does not,
as a general rule, prevent the running of the statute, or postpone
commencement of the period of limitation, until he discovers or
learns of his right thereunder."
In 1971, the Montana Legislature enacted a statute of limita-
tion to govern medical malpractice actions. 0 This statute extended
the discovery doctrine to all types of medical malpractice actions
but also imposed rigid time limits:
Action for injury or death against a physician. . . based upon such
person's alleged professional negligence, or for rendering services
without consent, or for error or omission in such person's practice,
shall be commenced within three (3) years after the date of injury
or three (3) years after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use
of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury which-
ever occurs last, but in no case may such action be commenced
after five (5) years from the date of injury.'
In effect, the statute sets up a flat period of three years in which
to bring an action for malpractice, then grants a two-year grace
period in which to discover the action, but bars all actions after five
years from the date of injury.42 Under such a statute, the plaintiff
in Johnson,43 the case originally adopting the discovery doctrine in
39. Carlson v. Ray Geophysical Div., 156 Mont. 450, 481 P.2d 327, 329 (1971). A compli-
cating factor entered into the Carlson decision. It was shown that the plaintiff knew about
his injury when there was one year left to run on the statute of limitation.
40. R.C.M. 1947, § 93-2624 (Supp. 1975).
41. Id. The omitted section is a listing of various occupations and institutions to which
the section applies. The statute also has a sentence having to do with fraudulent concealment:
"However, this time limitation shall be tolled for any period during which such person has
failed to disclose any act, error, or omission upon which such action is based and which is
known to him, or through the use of reasonable diligence subsequent to said act, error, or
omission would have been known to him." A single Montana case relying on this provision
has been decided. In it, the Montana Supreme Court held that where the plaintiff himself
should have known of his cause of action by virtue of his continued disability, there could be
no fraudulent concealment. Monroe v. Harper, 164 Mont. 23, 518 P.2d 788 (1974).
42. R.C.M. 1947, § 93-2624.
43. Johnson v. Saint Patrick's Hosp., 148 Mont. 125, 417 P.2d 469 (1966).
[Vol. 38
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Montana, would have been barred from recovery because he did not
discover the gauze pad in his hip until seven years after surgery. The
plaintiff in Grey," on the other hand, would have been allowed to
prosecute his claim.
C. The Status of the Discovery Doctrine in Montana
With the enactment of the 1971 statute," it would seem that
the status of the discovery doctrine in Montana is clear. R.C.M.
1947, § 12-201 provides "[n]o law . . . is retroactive unless ex-
pressly so declared." The 1971 statute does not contain an express
declaration of retroactivity. The discovery doctrine in Montana can
thus be summarized:
(1) For malpractice actions accruing before July 1, 1971,6 the
discovery doctrine as laid down in Johnson and modified in Grey,
will apply; the cause of action will accrue and the statute of limita-
tion will start to run as of the date the plaintiff discovers or should
have discovered his injury. The applicable statute of limitation is
section 93-2605(3)."
(2) For malpractice actions accruing after July 1, 1971, the
provisions of section 93-2624 will govern; the action must be brought
within three years of the date of injury or within three years of the
date of discovery (or date discovery should have been made), but
not more than five years from the date of injury regardless of the
date of discovery.
II. ACCRUAL OF A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
A. Penrod v. Hoskinson48
The two versions of the discovery rule noted above suggest a
problem in deciding which version should be used to decide a case.
This problem was presented to the Montana Supreme Court by the
certification of the question by Judge Battin of the United States
District Court for the District of Montana:
Is § 93-2624, R.C.M. 1947, as amended, enacted in 1971, or is § 93-
2605, R.C.M. 1947, the applicable statute of limitation in a medi-
cal malpractice action in which the alleged negligent act took place
44. Grey v. Silver Bow County, 149 Mont. 213, 425 P.2d 819 (1967).
45. R.C.M. 1947, § 93-2624.
46. R.C.M. 1947, § 93-507, provides: "Every statute, unless a different time is pre-
scribed therein, takes effect on the first day of July of the year of its passage and approval."
The malpractice statute, R.C.M. 1947, § 93-2624, had no contrary provision and therefore
became effective on July 1, 1971.
47. R.C.M. 1947, § 93-2605(3).
48. Penrod v. Hoskinson, __ Mont. __, 552 P.2d 325 (1976).
1977]
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in May of 1969, the plaintiff allegedly having discovered the negli-
gence in September of 1973, and the action having been filed on
April 23, 1975?"
The facts of the case were simple. In 1969, plaintiff underwent
a hysterectomy, gallbladder removal, and incidental appendec-
tomy. In 1973, during a routine physical examination, she was told
that she had a surgical drain in the area of her spleen. In 1974, the
drain was removed. In 1975, she filed a malpractice action against
the physician who had performed the original surgery in 1969.
Thus, the events of the case clearly straddled the demarcation
line of the 1971 enactment of Montana's medical malpractice stat-
ute of limitation; plaintiff was operated on in 1969, before the stat-
ute was effective, but did not discover her injury until 1973, after
the effective date of the, statute." The question facing the court,
simply put, was: Which of the two versions of Montana's discovery
doctrine applied - the judicial rule in force at the time of the
alleged negligent act or the statutory rule in force at the time of
discovery of the injury?
The answer, of course, had important ramifications for Jeanette
Penrod. If the court held her cause of action accrued on the date of
her first surgery in 1969 and that section 93-2624 was the applicable
statute, then the five-year outer limit of the statute would bar her
claim filed in 1975. On the other hand, if her cause of action were
held to accrue in 1969 and if section 93-2605 were held to be the
applicable statute, then the three-year limit of this statute in con-
junction with the discovery doctrine of Johnson' would permit her
action.
In deciding for the plaintiff, the court focused on the lack of
retroactivity of section 93-2624. Noting that section 12-20111 pro-
vides that no law is retroactive unless expressly so declared by the
legislature and finding "nothing in R.C.M. 1947, § 93-2624 exhibit-
ing a legislative intent that it be applied retroactively, 5 3 the court
held:
[Sjection 93-2605, R.C.M. 1947, is the applicable statute of limi-
tation in a medical malpractice in which the alleged negligent act
took place in May, 1969, the plaintiff allegedly having discovered
the negligence in September, 1973, and the action having been
filed on April 23, 1975.11
49. Id. at -, 552 P.2d at 325-26.
50. See note 45, supra.
51. Johnson v. Saint Patrick's Hosp., 148 Mont. 125, 417 P.2d 469 (1966).
52. R.C.M. 1947, § 12-201.
53. Penrod v. Hoskinson, __ Mont. -, 552 P.2d 325, 327 (1976).
54. Id. at -, 552 P.2d at 328.
406 [Vol. 38
8
Montana Law Review, Vol. 38 [1977], Iss. 2, Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol38/iss2/10
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
At first reading, the opinion and the result reached by the court
produce a satisfying resolution to this case. The plaintiff's cause of
action was preserved under the discovery doctrine and she was al-
lowed to pursue her claim for damages. The result neither unfairly
burdens the defendant nor violates the equitable criteria of Grey.55
This resolution does not withstand closer scrutiny, however. To
reach its conclusion, the court accepted the argument of both sides
that the alleged malpractice occurred on May 6, 1969.50 The court
then rejected the defendant's argument that section 93-2624 should
be "applied to claims arising prior to 1971, the date of its enact-
ment."57 (emphasis added). The court's holding that plaintiff's
claim accrued in 1969 conflicts with language of other Montana
statutes of limitation, with its own decisions interpreting those stat-
utes, with the language of the discovery doctrine itself, and with the
decisions on this question by courts of other states. The conflict with
each of these will be examined below.
Montana's statutes of limitation, including section 93-2605,
often are not specific as to when the statute begins to run on various
actions. 8 Many that do specify a time provide that the actions must
be commenced within the statutory period after "the cause of action
shall have accrued."59 The Montana Supreme Court has held that
a statute of limitation does not begin to run until a cause of action
accrues.'" If this concept were applied to section 93-2605 and the
situation in Penrod, then the statute should have begun to run as
of May 6, 1969, the date the court held the cause accrued, and
should have expired as of May 6, 1972, nearly three years before
plaintiff filed her action.
The language of the discovery doctrine itself suggests that the
court's view that Penrod's cause of action accrued in 1969 is incor-
rect: "[In cases where foreign objects are negligently left in a pa-
tient's body by a surgeon], the cause of action does not accrue until
the patient learns of or in the exercise of reasonable care and dili-
gence should have learned of the presence of such foreign object in
his body."'" (emphasis added).
Under the language of the discovery doctrine, then, Penrod's
cause of action accrued in 1973 at the time of discovery of the surgi-
cal drain left in her body. The statute of limitation then applicable
55. Grey v. Silver Bow County, 149 Mont. 213, 425 P.2d 819 (1967).
56. Penrod v. Hoskinson, * Mont. -, 552 P.2d 325, 326 (1976).
57. Id. at -, 552 P.2d at 327.
58. See, e.g., R.C.M. 1947, §§ 93-2602, 93-2603, 93-2604, 93-2606.
59. See, e.g., R.C.M. 1947, §§ 93-2610, 93-2613.
60. State ex rel. Clark v. Bailey, 99 Mont. 484, 94 P.2d 740 (1935).
61. Johnson v. Saint Patrick's Hosp., 148 Mont. 125, 417 P.2d 469, 473 (1966).
19771
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would be section 93-2624, the specific malpractice statute, which
became effective in 1971. Because the plaintiff did not file her action
within five years of the date of injury as required by this statute,
she would be barred from prosecuting it.
Thus, though the court reached a just result, it created a new
rule inconsistent with the discovery doctrine. To determine which
statute of limitation governs an action for malpractice, the cause of
action will be deemed to accrue at the time of injury."2 To determine
when the statute of limitation begins to run against that action, the
cause of action will be deemed to accrue at the time of discovery of
the injury."
B. The View in Other States
In Stoner v. Carr,64 decided barely two months before Penrod,",
the Idaho Supreme Court, from which Montana adopted its discov-
ery doctrine, reached a result exactly opposite that reached in
Penrod. In Stoner, the plaintiff had surgery in 1971, and in 1973
discovered a surgical needle had been left in her abdomen. In the
interval, the Idaho Legislature had amended the statute of limita-
tion governing medical malpractice actions, reducing the time al-
lowed for such actions from two years to one year following discovery
of the foreign object. This amendment became effective on March
24, 1971. Plaintiff filed her action in December, 1974, seventeen
months after discovery of the needle.
In holding that the 1971 amendment barred the action, the
supreme court said:
[K]nowledge (actual or constructive) of a foreign object left in the
body is required before the cause of action can be deemed to accrue
in such cases. The statute of limitation in effect when the right of
action is deemed to accrue defines that statutory period unless the
legislature provides otherwise. The plaintiffs cause of action here
is deemed to accrue July 31, 1973, when the surgical needle was
discovered in Mrs. Stoner's abdomen. Thus, the statute of limita-
tion began to run at this time. 7 (emphasis added).
As to whether the decision involved a retroactive application of
the 1971 amendment, the Idaho court stated:
A law is not retroactive merely because part of the factual situation
62. Penrod v. Hoskinson, __ Mont. -, 552 P.2d 325 (1976).
63. Johnson v. Saint Patrick's Hosp., 148 Mont. 125, 417 P.2d 469 (1966).
64. 97 Idaho 641, 550 P.2d 259 (1976).
65. Stoner was decided on May 3, 1976; Penrod was decided on July 21, 1976.
66. IDAHO CODE, § 5-219(4) (Supp. 1976).
67. Stoner v. Cart, 97 Idaho 641, 550 P.2d 259 (1976).
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to which it is applied occurred prior to its enactment. . . .In cases
such as the present, the right to compensation does not accrue and
the rights of the parties do not become fixed until the occurrence
of the event . . . which gives rise to a cause of action. 8
Idaho thus adopted a consistent approach as to when a cause of
action for malpractice accrues; in determining both which statute
of limitation governs and when the statute begins to run, the cause
of action accrues on discovery.
Courts in Colorado 9 and New Hampshire70 have reached the
same result as the Idaho Supreme Court.
Two decisions by Michigan courts7" support the Montana Su-
preme Court's decision. In Quinlan v. Gudes,7 2 the plaintiff received
x-ray treatments for facial skin eruptions during 1952-1954. In Janu-
ary, 1963, she was informed she had cancer of the soft palate, caused
by the x-ray treatments. She brought an action twenty-three
months later. On January 1, 1963, Michigan statutorily adopted the
continuing treatment rule,7 3 allowing actions to be initiated within
a two-year period following the last treatment by the doctor inflict-
ing the injury. This statute, if applied, would have barred plaintiff's
action as of 1956.
The Michigan Court of Appeals refused to apply the statute,
instead adhering to the discovery doctrine enunciated in Johnson v.
Caldwell,74 and giving the plaintiff two years from the time of dis-
covery to file her action. "Though the plaintiffs did not discover
their rights to a cause of action in this case until the [new statute]
was in effect, it is the Court's view they had acquired these rights
prior to January 1, 1963." 7
The statute of limitation governing the cause of action thus
attached at the time of the wrongful act, but its running was post-
poned until time of discovery. The Michigan Supreme Court
adopted this rule in 1969.11 Neither of these Michigan decisions are
cited by the Montana Supreme Court in Penrod.
Some jurisdictions have adopted a third approach to this prob-
68. Id. at 643, 550 P.2d at 261, quoting Arnold v. Woolley, 95 Idaho 604, 514 P.2d 599,
601 (1973).
69. Valenzuela v. Mercy Hosp., 521 P.2d 1287 (Colo. App. 1974).
70. Patrick v. Morin, - N.H. -, 345 A.2d 389 (1975).
71. Quinlan v. Gudes, 2 Mich. App. 506, 140 N.W.2d 782 (1966); Winfrey v. Farhat,
382 Mich. 380, 170 N.W.2d 34 (1969).
72. 2 Mich. App. 506, 140 N.W.2d 782 (1966).
73. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.5838 (Supp. 1976).
74. 371 Mich. 368, 123 N.W.2d 785 (1963).
75. Quinlan v. Gudes, 2 Mich. App. 506, 140 N.W.2d 782, 784 (1966).
76. Winfrey v. Farhat, 382 Mich. 380, 170 N.W.2d 34 (1969).
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lem. In Greenhalgh v. Payson City,77 the Utah Supreme Court
stated this approach:
It is well established that the Legislature may reduce a period of
limitations and apply a new and shorter period to previously ac-
crued causes of action, so long as a reasonable time is allowed to
bring such an action. . . .The result of this is actually prospective
in that the statutory change relates to procedure to occur in the
future."8
The determinative inquiry of this approach is whether the person,
who, prior to the modification of the applicable statute of limita-
tion, had a valid cause of action, still has a reasonable period of time
in which to file the action. The Nebraska Supreme Court has held
a reasonable period of time in which to file to be four months follow-
ing accrual of the cause of action.79
The Montana Supreme Court in Penrod rejected the
"reasonable time to file" approach argued by the defendant: 0
The [approach] is based on the proposition that a statute of limi-
tation affects the remedy, not the right, and is to be applied to all
cases thereafter brought irrespective of when the cause of action
arose, subject to a reasonable period thereafter in which the right
can be asserted. This is directly contrary to Montana's statute,
section 12-201, which prohibits retroactive operation of statutes
"unless expressly so declared."'"
The court then cited decisions of two Florida Courts of Appeals82 to
support its rejection of this doctrine. These two courts have since
reversed their positions and adopted the "reasonable time to file"
doctrine. 3 The result of these reversals is to weaken the rejection in
Penrod of the "reasonable time to file" approach.
Had the Montana Supreme Court in Penrod accepted the
"reasonable time to file" approach, it may have decided that plain-
tiff's cause of action was barred, especially in view of the ruling in
77. 530 P.2d 799 (Utah 1975).
78. Id. at 803.
79. Educational Services Unit No. 3 v. Mammel, Olson, Shropp, Horn, & Swartzbaugh,
Inc., 192 Neb. 431, 222 N.W.2d 125 (1974).
80. Defendant based his argument of this principle on Steele v. Gann, 197 Ark. 480,
123 S.W.2d 520 (1939).
81. Penrod v. Hoskinson, - Mont. - , 552 P.2d 325, 328 (1976).
82. Maltempo v. Cuthbert, 288 So.2d 517 (Fla. App. 1974); DeLuca v. Mathews, 297
So.2d 854 (Fla. App. 1976).
83. The Second District Court of Appeals, which had decided Maltempo, reversed its
position in Foley v. Morris, 325 So.2d 37 (Fla. App. 1976). The Fourth District Court of
Appeals, which had decided DeLuca, reversed its position in Harris v. Miles, 330 So.2d 181
(Fla. App. 1976).
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Nebraska 4 that four months was a reasonable time to which to file.
Under this rule, section 93-2624 would have been the applicable
statute. Penrod, then, had eight months - from September 21,
1973, the date she discovered the presence of the surgical drain,
until May 6, 1974, when the five-year limit of section 93-2624 ex-
pired - to file her action. This seems to be within the bounds of
reasonableness as far as time to file. 5 Her action, filed on April 23,
1975, would therefore have been barred.
III. CONCLUSION
With its decision in Penrod, the Montana Supreme Court has
created a dual standard to determine when a cause of action for
medical malpractice accrues: one to determine which statute of
limitation governs (time of injury), and another to determine when
the statute begins to run (time of discovery). The desirability of
such a dual standard is questionable.
The result reached in Idaho, on the other hand, where time of
discovery determines both which statute of limitation governs and
when the statute begins to run, is conceptually consistent. It also
has the benefit of avoiding any retroactivity problems.
The "reasonable time to file" approach has the least to com-
mend it. Though courts have disavowed any arguments that they
are retroactively applying the new statute, in fact this is exactly
what they are doing. The appearance is one of unfairness, of strip-
ping a party of his action by applying a new statute to an old
situation. This unfairness justifies rejection of the approach.
Perhaps the real problem in the Penrod-type case is in section
93-2624 itself. By imposing a five-year maximum time limit from
the date of injury for filing a malpractice action, the statute can be
expected to deprive persons legitimately injured by medical negli-
gence of their causes of action if the damaging effects of such negli-
gence are concealed for more than five years. As indicated by the
incidents discussed in this note, five years is not long enough for
discovery of some types of malpractice. It may have been in re-
sponse to this harshness that the Montana Supreme Court devised
its rule in Penrod. If so, then we have come full circle on the question
of when the cause of action accrues in medical malpractice cases.
84. Educational Services Unit No. 3 v. Mammel, Olson, Shropp, Horn, & Swartzbaugh,
Inc., 192 Neb. 431, 222 N.W.2d 125 (1974).
85. See ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 25 (Supp. 1975), providing that the action be brought within
six months after discovery of the injury.
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